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Abstract
Drawing on a dataset constructed from a parallel series of nationally 
representative surveys of multinational companies (MNCs), we compare the 
performance management (PM) practices of MNCs in the UK, Ireland, Canada, 
Spain, Denmark and Norway. In each country we analyze data relating to 
MNCs from that country and of the foreign affiliates of US MNCs. We argue 
that there is evidence of standardization in the nature of practices across 
countries, particularly evident in the analysis of US MNCs. Standardization of 
practices among MNCs is also evident in the rather limited variation in practices 
between US and indigenous MNCs within each country. Moreover, even where 
there is evidence of variation across and within countries, this cannot be fully 
explained by adaptation to local institutional constraints but rather can be seen 
as the product of how distinct national contexts can promote the take-up of 
practices.
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INTRODUCTION
During the last two decades many researchers have focused on how
multinational companies (MNCs) standardize human resource
management (HRM) practices across countries. Strategies of stan-
dardization can be based on HRM practices that constitute a ‘firm
specific advantage’ (Rugman & Verbeke, 2003). Some authors have
argued that standardization around ‘a worldwide best practices
model is clearly present’ (Pudelko & Harzing, 2007). However, there
remain significant forces towards adapting practices to national
context. The continuing diversity in national ‘varieties of capital-
ism’ (Hall & Soskice, 2001) suggests that MNCs are at least partially
constrained by local institutions. Indeed, some have argued that
‘adherence to local practices is the dominant influence’ on the
practices of MNCs (Rosenzweig & Nohria, 1994: 250). More
recently, other authors have argued that MNCs balance the
standardization and differentiation of their practices (e.g. Stavrou,
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Brewster, & Charalambous, 2010). Bonache, Trul-
len, and Sanchez (2012: 1779) argue for a ‘cultur-
ally-animated universalism’ in which MNCs
balance the advantages of universalism (standard-
ization) with those of culturalism (differentiation).
Similarly, the concept of ‘institutional distance’ has
been used to analyze ways in which MNCs handle
these competing pressures. The institutions of the
parent company and those from the subsidiary’s
host environment combine to create conditions of
‘institutional duality’ and the extent of divergence
between these twin pressures is the institutional
distance (Kostova, 1999; Salomon & Wu, 2012).
The greater is this distance, so the argument goes,
the more complicated is the transfer of practices.
(See Caprar, Devinney, Kirkman, & Caligiuri, 2015
for a review of the parallel arguments concerning
culture and cultural distance.)
Notwithstanding its contribution, this literature
suffers from two theoretical weaknesses. First, it has
played down the heterogeneous nature of MNCs
operating in the same institutional context. This
heterogeneity resulted in the fact that institutional
pressures are rarely uniform and coherent across a
country; instead, institutions are partial in their
coverage and malleable in the hands of large firms
(Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Thus we need to incorpo-
rate this notion of ‘intra-national’ heterogeneity
into our analysis, which we do by examining one
form of this heterogeneity, namely the extent of
difference in practices between distinct national
groups of MNCs. Second, the standardization–dif-
ferentiation literature has also played down a
different element of heterogeneity, namely the
range of ways in which MNCs develop interna-
tional strategies in HRM. It is widely assumed that
all MNCs want to standardize their HR practices
across countries and only fail to do so if they
reluctantly accept the constraints of host countries
(see Edwards & Kuruvilla, 2005). In reality, how-
ever, the strategies and configurations of MNCs are
diverse, with some seeking to segment their oper-
ations so that they concentrate particular functions
in the countries with the most advantageous con-
ditions (Dunning, 2009) and, accordingly, they
deliberately differentiate their employment prac-
tices to benefit from country-specific conditions
(Compa, 2012; Wilkinson, Gamble, Humphrey,
Morris, & Anthony, 2001).
In addition to these theoretical weaknesses, there
are also methodological limitations in empirical
studies of standardization–differentiation. With
some exceptions (e.g. Brewster, Wood, & Brookes,
2008; Pudelko & Harzing, 2007), previous research
has failed to study MNCs in their original country.
A key test of whether MNCs really have developed
standardized practices along the lines of global
norms is whether they manage their indigenous
workforces in similar ways. If they are globally
integrated firms influenced by comparable compet-
itive forces then we would see similar patterns of
practice in the domestic operations of MNCs across
countries. Ideally, cross-national studies involve
one group of MNCs being compared with those of
another; as a comparator to indigenous MNCs,
those from the USA are interesting conceptually
because they are emissaries of the dominant eco-
nomic system (Smith & Meiksins, 1995). Moreover,
in a large majority of developed nations and many
developing nations too, US FDI is the biggest single
national source (Dicken, 2011).
We address the following two questions. First,
are there differences in the take-up of practices
across countries? This will help us address whether
there are localizing effects in evidence, or whether
these have been over-ridden by the pressures
towards standardization. We address this for MNCs
as a whole and subsequently by splitting MNCs
into the separate groups of indigenous and US-
owned. Second, are there significant differences in
the take-up of practices between these two groups?
In addressing this question we will explore one
element of the extent of ‘intra-national’ hetero-
geneity of MNCs of different nationalities and
compare this across countries. By examining the
practices of indigenous firms alongside those of
the dominant economic power, the USA, we are
able to throw new light on the crucial, yet
neglected, issue of how MNCs manage their
domestic workforces and on the issue of how US
MNCs operate in a set of contrasting host coun-
tries. Analysis of survey data relating to a set of
performance management (PM) practices in MNCs
across six countries demonstrates that there is
evidence of standardization in the nature of
practices across countries, particularly evident in
the analysis of US MNCs. Standardization of
practices among MNCs is also evident in the
rather limited variation in practices between US
and indigenous MNCs within each country. More-
over, even where there is evidence of variation
across and within countries, this cannot be fully
explained by adaptation to local institutional
constraints but rather can be seen as the product
of how distinct national institutions can promote
the take-up of practices.
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The article is structured as follows. We review
lessons from the standardization–differentiation
literature in the next section and establish our key
theoretical constructs and hypotheses in the sub-
sequent one. Thereafter, we describe and justify our
method, present the results, discuss the implica-
tions of these and draw conclusions.
RESEARCHING STANDARDIZATION–
DIFFERENTIATION IN MNCS
Studies of the standardization–differentiation issue
have adopted contrasting research designs. Some
research uses a single host country (e.g. Rosenzweig
& Nohria, 1994) while others are multi-country
studies (e.g. Farndale, Brewster, & Poutsma, 2008).
The latter have the clear advantage of allowing
comparisons across host countries. However, large
numbers of host countries make it impossible to
contextualize the findings. Consequently, configu-
rations of national institutions are reduced to
dummy variables or indices, such as ‘country
institutional profiles’ (Kostova & Roth, 2002), with
little discussion of how they inform the practices of
MNCs (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Thus the challenge
is to have sufficient national diversity to facilitate
interesting comparisons but not so much as to
prevent a consideration of each country. A further
contrast is that while MNCs from different coun-
tries are sometimes grouped together into broad
and diverse categories, often simply ‘foreign’ (e.g.
Brewster et al., 2008), others separate out particular
nationalities (e.g. Pudelko & Harzing, 2007). A way
of balancing these considerations is to group
countries only where they share relevant institu-
tional characteristics. Adapting the distinction
made by Whetten (1989), a desire for ‘comprehen-
siveness’ in incorporating every national specificity
must be weighed against the need for ‘parsimony’
by grouping countries that share institutions that
are likely to affect the variables of interest.
Previous research also varies with respect to how
particular practices are studied. Some research asks
respondents to provide information on the work-
force as a whole (e.g. Brewster et al., 2008; Pudelko
& Harzing, 2007) while other research asks ques-
tions pertaining to particular occupational groups
(e.g. Marginson, Edwards, Edwards, Ferner, & Tre-
gaskis, 2010). The former may lack precision with
respondents providing information that is an ‘av-
erage’ of the whole workforce, masking differences
between groups, or the respondent may focus on a
particular group which is not representative of the
workforce. Asking about particular occupational
groups minimizes this problem. Similarly, while
some studies have asked about broad characteristics
to which practices tend (e.g. Pudelko & Harzing,
2007), others seek information on particular prac-
tices in operation (Farndale et al., 2008). The
danger of the former is that the data relate to what
is ‘intended’ by policymakers in HR rather than
what is ‘implemented’ and experienced by employ-
ees (Khilji & Wang, 2006; see also Bjo¨rkman,
Ehrnrooth, Smale, & John, 2011). The gap between
the two may be particularly significant in interna-
tional research in which ‘intended’ policies may
reflect the formal institutions that policymakers
can easily understand but are less likely to reflect
informal institutions.
The practices here are in the area of PM, specif-
ically whether individual performance is assessed,
whether these assessments are ranked in a ‘forced
distribution’ and whether employees’ pay is linked
to their individual performance. This area is one
that MNCs see as strategically important, requiring
an internationally coordinated approach, particu-
larly for managers (Bjo¨rkman & Lervik, 2007: 325).
Moreover, we anticipate that US MNCs will see
these practices as particularly important given the
institutional context of the home country. A con-
certed attempt to measure the performance of
individual employees, as opposed to groups, is
evident in the prevalence of individual appraisal
schemes in the USA (Chiang & Birtch, 2007;
Ramamoorthy & Carroll, 1998), while the emphasis
on rating the relative performance of employees is
evident in the popularity of ‘forced distributions’
among US firms (Grote, 2005; Lawler, 2003). By
international standards, pay in the USA is more
commonly determined by assessments of perfor-
mance (Ferner & Almond, 2013; Jacoby, 2005). This
emphasis on individualism is a key characteristic of
the USA, enshrined both in terms of the formal
institutions, such as the anti-collectivist forms of
labour regulation, and the informal institutions,
norms and values which afford these practices a
degree of legitimacy (e.g. Almond & Ferner, 2006).
In this sense, PM is an appropriate area to examine
if we want to consider the influence of US institu-
tions. Moreover, it is likely that they will also be
constrained by the institutions of the host coun-
tries (a point we return to in the next section).
The strategic importance placed on PM might
mean that MNCs, especially US-owned ones, pur-
sue a coherent ‘bundle’ of practices which are
‘integrated’ with compatible practices with which
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they are ‘working in concert’ (Bjo¨rkman & Lervik,
2007: 323). Indeed, the practices we examine are
often seen as an important part of a coherent
approach to ‘high performance work systems’
(Becker & Huselid, 1998). However, compensation
and appraisal practices often perform overlapping
yet partially distinct functions: the former are seen
as effective in shaping knowledge, skills, abilities
and motivation but not empowerment; the latter
are perceived to influence motivation and empow-
erment, but not knowledge, skills or abilities (Jiang,
Takeuchi, & Lepak, 2013: 1469). Thus variable pay
may perform one set of functions, while appraisal
might fulfil other goals, and they will not neces-
sarily be as integrated as the notion of bundles
suggests.
Out of this review of previous work has emerged a
rationale for country selection (some diversity in
institutional context but not so many countries as
to prevent a detailed consideration of each) and for
the practices (a clear focus on an area of HRM
which is one of strategic importance in MNCs while
also subject to institutional influences). We now
turn to consider how institutional theory can help
us build hypotheses.
WHY DO WE FIND SIMILARITIES
AND DIFFERENCES AMONG MNCS?
A key insight of organizational institutionalism is
that organizational practices not only reflect inter-
nal efficiency motives but also ‘logics of appropri-
ateness’ that are conditioned by their institutional
environments (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Such
dominant logics reflect isomorphic pressures for
conformity that are shared by actors in the same
organizational domain. Organizations conform to
such pressures in order to gain endorsement from
important referent audiences (Greenwood, Ray-
nard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011),
thereby increasing organizational legitimacy and
facilitating access to important resources, such as
funds or licenses to operate (Pache & Santos, 2010).
Given that MNCs are embedded in their home
country (Tan & Meyer, 2011; Wang, Clegg, &
Kafouros, 2009), they must continue to gain a
degree of approval from their ‘referent audiences’
(Greenwood et al., 2011) in their original national
base as they expand internationally. In particular,
satisfying owners’ demands is an important ele-
ment of a ‘governance’ or ‘country of origin’ effect
(Ferner, 1997). Thus MNCs of differing nationali-
ties exhibit distinct patterns of management
coordination and control internationally. For US
MNCs, this country-of-origin effect is likely to be
particularly pronounced as the ways in which US
firms developed in their home country provide
them with the organizational means with which to
expand internationally by extending management
structures and forms of control to other countries
(Ferner et al., 2004). Thus exercising control over
their operations in other countries is easier relative
to MNCs (ibid.) of other nations and it is salient to
examine US MNCs as a counterpoint to indigenous
MNCs.
Indeed, this salience is even greater when we
consider ‘dominance effects’. At any one time there
is a hierarchy of nation states according to their
economic performance, with the ‘dominant’ model
forming the basis of a set of practices that attract
interest amongst actors in other countries (Smith &
Meiskins, 1995). As MNCs become more interna-
tionally integrated, the organizational barriers to
common policies decline, while the growth of
international competition has created greater inter-
est in the practices of firms internationally and the
greater ease with which information can be trans-
mitted across borders has meant that the interest in
cross-national transfer is greater than ever. Such
developments can go hand-in-hand with manage-
ment techniques across the world increasingly
revolving around notions of global ‘best practice’
(e.g. Jain, Lawler, & Morishima, 1998). Moreover,
Pudelko and Harzing (2007) considered the relative
influences of country-of-origin, localization and
dominance effects on HRM practices in their study
of US, German and Japanese MNCs and concluded
that ‘overall the dominance effect is most impor-
tant’ (Pudelko & Harzing, 2007: 535). Recently, the
dominant national model has been the USA and
consequently US MNCs’ origins in the world’s most
powerful economy mean that they become bearers
of dominance effects (Edwards & Ferner, 2002). In a
similar vein, Kostova, Roth, and Dacin (2008: 999)
have argued that ‘a single clearly defined organiza-
tional field does not exist’ for MNCs and that this
gives ‘these organizations broader latitude in pick-
ing and choosing which models to adopt and to
what extent they should respond to institutional
influences’. In particular, they argue that there is
little enforcement mechanism for the ‘cognitive
and normative institutional components’ that they
encounter in different countries.
The ability of MNCs originating in the dominant
economy to exploit the room for manoeuvre that
exists within each host country is significant
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because of the way in which dominance effects act
to reinforce country-of-origin effects in US MNCs.
Accordingly, recent evidence has shown that US
MNCs adopt a more centralized approach to
managing their international workforces than
MNCs of other nationalities (Ferner, Belanger,
Tregaskis, Morley, & Quintanilla, 2013). Moreover,
the practices of US MNCs are only ‘partly rooted in
the local cultural, political and legal structures of
the country of operation’ (Gooderham, Nordhaug,
& Ringdal, 1998: 63) with these firms taking
concerted steps to avoid the influence of bodies
that make it difficult to implement their preferred
policies and practices (Tempel, Edwards, Ferner,
Muller-Carmen, & Wachter, 2006). This argument
has been forcefully developed by Geary and Roche
(2001: 109) who reject what they call the ‘new
conformance thesis’ – the idea that US MNCs in
Ireland have conformed to local practices – and
point instead to the ‘predominance of country-of-
origin effects over host country effects’. This indi-
cates that US MNCs employ similar practices
worldwide.
While country-of-origin and dominance effects
may lead US MNCs to standardize their practices in
a way that may over-ride local institutions, there
are grounds for believing that institutional pres-
sures toward differentiation will be evident in
MNCs more generally. The institutions in host
countries have certainly not converged completely,
as the comparative capitalisms literature has
demonstrated (Jackson & Deeg, 2008), and this
diversity leads to pressures for MNCs to seek
legitimacy by adapting to national norms; over-
riding these norms completely, particularly those
with regulatory status, entails some costs, either in
terms of motivational problems among the work-
force or through breaking the law (Kostova & Roth,
2002). Indeed, one strand of the literature has
emphasized local influences on the employment
practices of MNCs (e.g. Bjo¨rkman, Fey, & Park,
2007; Buckley & Enderwick, 1985; Gooderham
et al., 1998; Turner, D’Art, & Gunnigle, 1997). In
a widely cited paper (171 citations in EBSCO),
Rosenzweig and Nohria (1994) argued that the US
affiliates of foreign-owned MNCs ‘tend primarily to
resemble local practices’ and that this supported
‘the view of MNCs as a nexus of differentiated
practices’ (Rosenzweig & Nohria, 1994: 248). Given
this, it seems improbable that the forces towards
standardization are so strong that localization
tendencies are no longer evident at all in MNCs.
Where MNCs seek to spread the individualist PM
practices we examine across countries they may be
‘challenged on grounds of alternative normative
frameworks, emphasizing (for example) social
equity, solidarity and fairness’ (Ferner, Edwards, &
Tempel, 2012: 167). Specifically, there are two
particular elements of an institutional framework
that may constrain this take-up. The first relates to
the norms concerning inequality. Individualized
appraisal and pay appear to be easier to implement
in countries characterized by substantial income
inequalities (Gooderham, Grøgaard, & Nordhaug,
2013). Where incomes differ markedly there seems
to be a greater acceptance of practices that distin-
guish explicitly between individuals according to
their performance, particularly for workers in better
paying jobs (Lemieux, MacLeod, & Parent, 2009).
Thus the constraints to the take-up of such practices
are likely to be strongest in countries with low levels
of inequality. The second concerns the influence of
employee representation, with the need to negoti-
ate the introduction and operation of these prac-
tices varying across countries. Employees in
countries with strong trade unions are those most
likely to have the organizational means to mount
opposition. Individualized appraisal and pay have
commonly been viewed with suspicion by unions,
who are concerned that this reduces their involve-
ment in the setting of pay in particular and the basis
for collective organization more generally (Heery,
2000). Reviewing the evidence concerning unions’
effects on management and HRM, Verma (2005)
observes that union opposition to the subjective
nature of performance appraisal has led to the
incidence of this practice being lower in unionized
firms. Similarly, unions have commonly opposed
performance pay based on individual performance
as anti-collectivist; indeed, the incidence of perfor-
mance pay is often lower in unionized workplaces
(Gunnigle, Turner, & D’Art, 1998). Thus we might
anticipate that the higher the coverage of trade
unions across firms, the stronger are the barriers to
introducing individualized PM practices. Gooder-
ham et al. (2013) cite the example of Scandinavian
countries (characterized by relatively low levels of
income inequality and high levels of trade union
density) where the use of performance appraisal and
individualized pay is less widespread than in other
countries such as the UK. We refer to these two
factors – low levels of inequality and high levels of
union density – as the institutional constraints to
introducing PM practices, and hypothesize that:
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H1 MNCs in countries with stronger institu-
tional constraints have a lower take-up of: (a) in-
dividual appraisal; (b) forced distribution, and
(c) variable pay.
The first hypothesis focuses on differences
across countries between MNCs of different
nationalities in aggregate. As argued above, one
disadvantage of grouping firms together is that it
masks differences between nationalities. Thus we
examine whether there are differences in the take-
up of practices between the domestic operations
of MNCs in each country. Where the domestic
operations of MNCs are integrated into the wider
firm and where ‘dominance effects’ are at play
not just among US firms but also among MNCs of
other nationalities, then the domestic operations
of one nationality of MNCs may exhibit strong
similarities with the domestic operations of
others.
However, national effects on the take-up of
practices in MNCs are especially likely to be evident
among indigenous MNCs. This is partly because the
domestic operations of MNCs are firmly rooted in
the national context; while foreign MNCs some-
times establish ‘greenfield’ operations allowing
greater freedom in breaking with local norms,
indigenous MNCs generally have longer lasting
linkages with the country and are, therefore, more
likely to go with the grain of local practice.
National effects also arise because of a ‘governance’
effect; the embeddedness of MNCs in their original
country means that they exhibit distinct patterns of
management coordination and control that reflect
these national institutions. Thus for indigenous
MNCs the constraining effect of national institu-
tions and the governance effects of institutions
emanate from the same national system and con-
solidate one another. This is likely to lead to
notable differences between MNCs from different
countries. Thus the pressures of dominance effects
are highly unlikely to be so strong that the domes-
tic operations of MNCs in one country have the
same take-up of practices as those in other coun-
tries. We anticipate that localization tendencies
will be in evidence across all of the PM practices
and hypothesize that:
H2 Indigenous MNCs in countries with stronger
institutional constraints have a lower take-up of:
(a) individual appraisal, (b) forced distribution,
and (c) variable pay.
We have predicted that the practices of indigenous
MNCs will vary across the five countries but that
those of US MNCs will not vary to the same extent,
potentially creating one form of ‘intra-national’
heterogeneity. As noted above, the standardiza-
tion–differentiation literature has played down the
heterogeneous nature of institutions at national
level. Given the growing diversity of the workforces
in many countries, intra-national variations in
informal institutions, such as work values, can be
as great as variations across countries (Tung, 2008).
As Crouch (2005) argues, much of the comparative
capitalism literature plays down the partial coverage
and malleability of most institutions; in practice,
there is almost always scope for economic actors to
experiment in the practices they deploy. Accord-
ingly, Morgan (2009: 582) argues that MNCs are
‘active in developing institutional supports and
therefore are central to processes of institutional
reform and change’. As Jackson and Deeg (2008: 555)
put it, ‘while firm heterogeneity was always, to one
degree or another, a feature of national models, the
growth of MNEs does imply that the formal mech-
anisms of institutionalization at the national level
may become more fragmented, and lead to an overall
increase of diversity’.
While this notion of heterogeneity has not been
satisfactorily incorporated into the standardization–
differentiation literature, there are illustrations in
the wider literature of how MNCs actively contribute
to heterogeneity (e.g. Heywood & Jirjahn, 2014). For
instance, Japanese manufacturers have clustered
together in host countries, often in areas without a
strong industrial tradition, creating distinct forms of
business activity, particularly concerning their
labour practices (Elger & Smith, 2005). Moreover,
Katz and Darbishire’s (2000) analysis of seven indus-
trialized nations was that there was increasing
variation within each of these countries and that
one source of this variation within countries was
MNCs, particularly Japanese investments, which
have ‘spread Japanese-oriented work practices,
thereby adding another source of variation in
employment conditions’ (2000: 5). Katz and Dar-
bishire (2000) argue that the extent of variation in
employment practices within countries is shaped by
the character of industrial relations institutions.
Indeed, institutional effects may lead to differing
degrees of intra-national variation across countries.
So far we have argued that, compared with US
MNCs, the practices of indigenous MNCs will be
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more in line with national norms; the logic of this
argument is that the extent of difference between
US MNCs and indigenous ones will be modest in
countries that share some institutional characteris-
tics – particularly the norms concerning inequality
and the extent of union density – with the US.
Accordingly, research in the UK and Ireland has
demonstrated that a similar proportion of foreign-
owned and indigenous firms used performance-
related pay (e.g. Buckley & Enderwick, 1985; Turner
et al., 1997). In contrast, where the national
institutions are markedly different from those of
the US, the difference in practices between US and
indigenous MNCs will be greater. Thus we hypoth-
esize that:
H3 The difference between US MNCs and
indigenous MNCs in the take-up of a) individual
appraisal b) forced distribution and c) variable
pay will be greater in countries with strong
institutional constraints.
METHOD
The Research Design
The research comprises coordinated, parallel,
nationally representative surveys of employment
practices in MNCs. This article is based on six
surveys – the UK, Canada, Ireland, Spain, Denmark
and Norway – and draws on the data for indigenous
and US-owned MNCs. The respondent was a senior
HRM executive who completed a structured ques-
tionnaire, focused on several aspects of employ-
ment practice and which distinguished between
managers and the largest occupational group (LOG)
of non-managerial employees. The surveys also
asked a number of questions about the national
operations and the worldwide company, allowing a
range of controls to be used. Somewhat surpris-
ingly, much of the literature does not control for
factors which we know are key influences on many
HRM practices: sometimes no controls are used
(e.g. Pudelko & Harzing, 2007); where they are used
they are normally restricted to basic elements of the
subsidiary (e.g. Brewster et al., 2008); only rarely are
characteristics of the wider multinational included,
such as size of the worldwide firm and its structure
(e.g. Marginson et al., 2010); and never are controls
included which provide proxies for the inclination
and ability of MNCs to standardize practices (which
we term ‘strategic heterogeneity’).
Concerning representativeness, some previous
surveys do not provide any information on how
they established their population while others
name a single source as their population listing
(e.g. Rosenzweig & Nohria, 1994). The dangers of
relying on single sources are the incompleteness of,
and inaccuracies in, each listing. Each of our
surveys was representative of the population of
MNCs in that country, focusing on all but the
smallest MNCs (those with less than 500 employees
worldwide). To ensure representativeness we used
multiple listings and resolved discrepancies
through labour-intensive cross-checking. The
resulting list was ‘screened’ to check crucial aspects,
a time-consuming but important process; it
revealed that many companies were smaller than
the initial listing had suggested or were part of the
same multinational as another firm in the listing.
Moreover, checks were conducted to make sure that
the profile of MNCs in the achieved sample was in
line with the population.1 Thus the surveys are
based on comprehensive and reliable population
listings.
There were three further challenges. First, the
questionnaire was designed in English and was
translated into French, Spanish, Danish and Nor-
wegian. These translations were carefully checked
(including back translation) in order to ascertain
that equivalence in meaning had not been dis-
torted (Hult et al., 2008). Second, the method of
administering the questionnaire through face-to-
face interviews allows a longer questionnaire and
results in fewer missing data (McKnight, McKnight,
Sidani, & Figueredo, 2007). This was pursued in the
countries where it was feasible: the UK, Ireland and
Spain. In Canada, however, the geographical dis-
tances made interviews prohibitively expensive, so
respondents completed the questionnaire through
a paper version or online. In Denmark and Norway,
data were collected online, the preferred way of
collecting data in Scandinavia. Non-response to
questions in the Canadian, Danish and Norwegian
surveys was not significantly higher than in the
other three. Third, the surveys were in the field at
different times. The fieldwork was carried out in
2006 and early 2007 in the UK, Canada and Ireland
but in Spain the fieldwork began in 2007 and
extended until early 2009 while in Denmark and
Norway the survey was carried out in 2009 and
early 2010. Such a time lag between surveys used in
comparative analysis is not unusual (e.g. Whitfield,
Marginson, & Brown, 1994), though it is poten-
tially important given the change in economic
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conditions. We checked whether the data gathered
towards the end of the fieldwork period in Spain
were significantly different from those gathered
earlier. Regression analysis on the Spanish data for
the six practices examined here revealed that the
differences between the data collected pre- and
post-crisis were insignificant.
The response rates varied across the six surveys,
from 15 % in Canada, 18 % in the UK, 25 % in
Norway, 26 % in Denmark, 30 % in Spain to 50 %
in Ireland. The lower response rates were generally
in the countries with the larger populations,
meaning that the overall numbers of participating
firms in each country did not vary as much as the
response rates, while the checks for non-response
bias suggested this problem is very limited. The
total number of indigenous MNCs was 276 (44 in
UK, 43 in Canada, 47 in Ireland, 83 in Spain, 30 in
Denmark and 29 in Norway) and US-owned MNCs
totaled 444 (123 in UK, 106 in Canada, 101 in
Ireland, 90 in Spain, 17 in Denmark and 7 in
Norway), giving a total across the five countries of
720.
Variables and Form of Analysis
Dependent Variables
There are six practices that we assess: individual
appraisal for the LOG and for managers; forced
distributions in appraisal for the LOG and for
managers; and variable pay for the LOG and for
managers.2 For each of these, we assessed the
existence or otherwise of the practice in the
national operations of the MNC. We analyzed these
six binary variables individually rather than in a
bundle to allow for the different functions that
they may perform (see above) as well as to allow for
the possibility that they may be subject to different
degrees of institutional constraint. Thus we allow
for the patterns to vary by each practice and
employee group.3
Explanatory Variables
Our analysis of the national context was shaped by
the extent of similarities and differences in institu-
tions, particularly the extent of inequality and
union density. To balance the desire to cater for
important institutional specificities whilst also
achieving a degree of parsimony in the analysis,
we have grouped countries only where they share
characteristics in terms of these institutional con-
straints. As Table 1 shows, the two Nordic countries
are clearly distinct from the other four, with lower
inequality and higher union density. Indeed, pre-
vious analysis of the Nordic area has highlighted
important institutional similarities across countries
in the region (e.g. Amable, 2003) and, hence,
Denmark and Norway form a Nordic grouping
which is the reference category. While the other
four countries are not all of the same type of
capitalism – the UK, Ireland and Canada are all
broadly deregulated labour markets with single
channel forms of employee representation, distinct
from Spain in these respects – they share broad
similarities in terms of the institutional constraints
to PM practices, as Table 1 demonstrates. They are
not exactly the same of course, with Spain and the
UK exhibiting slightly higher inequality and lower
union density. To allow for the possibility that the
extent of institutional difference between the
Nordic countries and the others may vary, we
include a Nordic variable and the four individual
country variables in the analysis.4 The third
hypothesis, examining differences within coun-
tries, requires Denmark and Norway to be consid-
ered individually.
We used a dummy variable for US ownership.
Some of the controls relate to characteristics of the
subsidiaries: the sector variable contrasts produc-
tion and services; the size dummy captures sub-
sidiaries of 1000 or more employees; and union
presence assesses the existence of certified trade
unions in the subsidiary. Other controls relate to
characteristics of the worldwide company. The size
variable contrasts small MNCs (less than 5000
employees worldwide) with medium (between
5000 and 29999) and large (30000+), with the
small group forming the reference category.
As argued in the introduction, the analysis of
standardization–differentiation needs to be tested
in a way that is sensitive to the fact that not all
MNCs possess the capabilities to standardize
Table 1 Inequality and union density at national level Source:
OECD.StatExtracts
Ranking Inequality
(Gini coefficient)
Union density
(OECD)
1 USA (0.39) USA (10.8 %)
2 UK (0.35) Spain (17.5 %)
3 Spain (0.34) UK (25.4 %)
4 Canada (0.32) Canada (27.2 %)
5 Ireland (0.30) Ireland (29.6 %)
6 Norway (0.25) Norway (53.5 %)
7 Denmark (0.25) Denmark (66.8 %)
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practices across borders: some staffing strategies are
more effective than others at transferring knowl-
edge (Ma¨kela¨, Bjo¨rkman, & Ehrnrooth, 2009); there
is variation in the extent to which MNCs align
formal process and systems and the more informal
sharing of objectives across key staff, with this
affecting their ability to ‘replicate’ practices across
borders (Morris et al., 2009); and the experience of
subsidiary HR managers varies, shaping the extent
to which MNCs can develop strategic HR capabil-
ities (Ma¨kela¨, Sumelius, Hoglund, & Ahlvik, 2012).
Moreover, some MNCs will indeed seek to stan-
dardize and create the necessary capabilities and
the forces of country of origin and dominance
effects accentuate this in many MNCs. In contrast,
other MNCs will make a virtue out of differentiat-
ing practices across countries (Edwards & Kuruvilla,
2005). Thus we incorporate the notion of hetero-
geneity (for which we use the term ‘strategic
heterogeneity’) into our analysis through control-
ling for two factors, the existence of an interna-
tional policymaking committee in HRM and a
variable capturing the intensity of networking
between HRM practitioners across borders (a com-
posite measure of four elements of networking –
regular meetings, international conferences, task
forces and virtual groups – that were used at least
annually, with the resulting variable taking on
values between 0 for none of them and 4 for all of
them). These two final control variables allow us to
control for the inclination and capability of MNCs
to standardize HR practices across borders; in other
words, to control for strategic heterogeneity.
Analysis
The six binary variables are analyzed using logistic
regression. We started with a block of the control
variables and added a second block of country
dummies and the US ownership dummy. A third
block consists of interaction effects between US
ownership and the country dummies. The fourth
block includes, for each country, the interaction
between being a domestic firm and the dummy for
operating in that country. The inclusion of these
blocks enables us to address the set of hypotheses
we formulate, as explained below.
In deciding to use interaction terms, we consid-
ered the alternative of splitting the sample into
subsamples. Each approach has drawbacks. While
the interpretation of the results through the use of
interaction terms is not entirely straightforward, we
feel that using subsamples entails more significant
disadvantages, most obviously that some of the
subsamples become quite small and that the vari-
ability of some of the explanatory variables falls to
very low levels. Thus we felt that the use of
interaction terms is preferable. As a check, we re-
ran the analysis using the subsamples approach and
compared the results. In essence, where the sample
size of the subsamples allows for comparison, the
findings do not change greatly. Since we estimate
logit models, the difference in the coefficients do
not provide differences in the estimated probabil-
ities. To quantify the differences in the probabilities
of taking-up the practices across countries, we have
tested the marginal effects stemming from the
estimated models.
RESULTS
The descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 2
and 3. Some of the practices, such as individual
appraisal and variable pay for managers, are wide-
spread across countries while others, such as forced
distributions, are present in only a minority. Some
of the explanatory variables are significantly corre-
lated with one another. However, the variance
inflation factor (VIF) statistics for all models indi-
cate that multicollinearity is not a problem.
The logistic regression results are presented in
Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7. All estimated models are
significant, with satisfactory to good levels of
variation explained. In Tables 4, 5, and 6, the
results are presented in three columns for each
practice corresponding to the blocks of variables
identified above, with the logit coefficients and
standard errors. The inclusion of the controls is
justified by all models being significant with the
controls only (column A in Tables 4, 5, and 6) and
each control being significant in at least one model.
Interestingly, in all of the models at least one of the
HR function variables – an international HR poli-
cymaking committee and networking between HR
practitioners across countries – is significant in one
or more of the variants, confirming that controlling
for strategic heterogeneity is indeed important. The
results for the country dummies in column B
capture the aggregate differences between the
countries, enabling us to address Hypothesis 1.
There are significant differences in all six models. In
column C, which includes both the country dum-
mies and their interactions with US ownership, the
results for the country variables assess the differ-
ences in the take-up of PM practices in the domestic
operations of indigenous MNCs across countries,
thus allowing us to test Hypothesis 2. There is at
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least one significant difference between Nordic
MNCs and the other national groups of MNCs for
all six practices. Also from the results in column C,
but looking at both the country dummies and their
interactions with US ownership, we can assess
differences in the PM practices of US MNCs across
countries. In Table 7 we present each practice in
one column. Besides the controls, we include the
interactions of the country dummies with US
ownership and also with being a domestic firm,
helping us to test the differences in the take up of
the practices between US and indigenous MCS in
each country. From the estimated coefficients in
Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7, we have computed the
estimated differences in the probability of taking-
up the PM practices across countries.5 The results
are reported in Table 8, which contains panels for
each of the tests we conduct.
Regarding Hypotheses 1a–c (Table 8, first panel),
there are some significant differences in the antic-
ipated direction. MNCs in the Nordic area are less
likely than those in three of the other four coun-
tries (UK, Canada and Ireland) to deploy individual
appraisal for managers and less likely than those in
all four countries to use variable pay for managers.
They are also less likely than those in the UK to use
variable pay for the LOG. However, contrary to
expectations, they are more likely than those in
three of the other countries (UK, Canada and
Ireland) to use forced distribution for the LOG
and more likely than those in all four to use forced
distribution for managers. There are some insignif-
icant differences too, including for all country
comparisons for appraisal for the LOG. Overall,
there is support for Hypotheses 1a and 1c for the
managerial group but not the LOG and no support
for H1b.
Concerning Hypotheses 2a–c (second panel of
Table 8), indigenous MNCs in the Nordic area are
less likely than those in the UK to have appraisal for
the LOG, less likely than those in Ireland to have
appraisal for managers, less likely than those in
Canada and Spain to have variable pay for man-
agers. All of the other comparisons for appraisal
and variable pay were insignificant. (We cannot
provide estimates for appraisal for managers among
UK MNCs because the dependent variable has no
variability – all of the firms in this group have the
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables (% of firms)
UK Canada Ireland Spain Den Norw
Appraisal for the LOG
Indigenous 93 68 58 61 48 68
US 80 72 81 80 88 100
All 84 71 76 70 63 74
Appraisal for managers
Indigenous 100 90 88 83 63 72
US 95 96 96 88 88 100
All 96 95 94 86 72 78
Forced dist’n for the LOG
Indigenous 9 12 6 17 15 27
US 20 27 33 31 33 50
All 17 23 26 25 22 31
Forced dist’n for managers
Indigenous 12 16 12 22 25 38
US 26 41 42 30 40 50
All 22 34 35 27 31 41
Variable pay for the LOG
Indigenous 70 63 59 54 50 61
US 77 57 70 71 76 71
All 75 59 67 63 60 63
Variable pay for managers
Indigenous 84 95 88 98 80 83
US 93 92 91 97 76 71
All 91 92 90 98 79 81
Note: The variables for forced distribution include those who were not asked whether they had a forced distribution on the basis that they did not have
the prerequisite of an individual performance appraisal (these cases were coded as not having a forced distribution).
10
T
a
b
le
3
M
e
a
n
s
a
n
d
co
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
s
o
f
th
e
e
x
p
la
n
a
to
ry
va
ri
a
b
le
s
M
e
a
n
(%
)
N
S
e
ct
o
r
S
u
b
si
ze
U
n
io
n
p
re
s
W
W
si
ze
–
S
m
a
ll
W
W
si
ze
–
M
e
d
W
W
si
ze
–
La
rg
e
In
t’
l
H
R
co
m
m
.
H
R
N
e
tw
o
rk
U
K
C
a
n
a
d
a
Ir
e
la
n
d
S
p
a
in
D
e
n
-
m
a
rk
N
o
rw
a
y
U
S
-
o
w
n
e
d
S
e
ct
o
r
–
p
ro
d
’n
5
6
.5
7
2
0
1
.0
0
0
S
u
b
si
ze
(1
0
0
0
+
)
4
3
.5
7
1
3
-
0
.0
1
6
1
.0
0
0
U
n
io
n
p
re
se
n
ce
6
1
.2
7
1
7
0
.2
4
5
*
0
.2
2
6
*
1
.0
0
0
W
W
si
ze
–
sm
a
ll
3
8
.7
6
9
6
0
.0
8
2
*
-
0
.2
6
0
*
-
0
.0
7
9
*
1
.0
0
0
W
W
si
ze
–
m
e
d
3
4
.9
6
9
6
-
0
.0
0
3
0
.1
2
3
*
0
.0
5
3
-
0
.5
8
1
*
1
.0
0
0
W
W
si
ze
–
la
rg
e
2
6
.4
6
9
6
-
0
.0
8
7
*
0
.1
5
4
*
0
.0
2
9
-
0
.4
7
6
*
-
0
.4
3
9
*
1
.0
0
0
In
t’
l
H
R
co
m
m
.
6
6
.0
7
0
6
-
0
.0
2
8
-
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
1
3
-
0
.2
0
3
*
0
.0
6
0
0
.1
5
8
*
1
.0
0
0
H
R
n
e
tw
o
rk
1
.7
7
#
6
9
9
-
0
.0
2
8
0
.0
7
0
-
0
.1
5
0
*
-
0
.2
5
2
*
0
.0
0
4
0
.2
7
4
*
0
.3
2
3
*
1
.0
0
0
U
K
2
3
.2
7
2
0
-
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
2
9
-
0
.1
7
0
*
-
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
2
6
-
0
.0
2
7
-
0
.0
8
9
*
-
0
.0
4
4
1
.0
0
0
C
a
n
a
d
a
2
0
.7
7
2
0
0
.1
9
2
*
-
0
.0
5
4
-
0
.1
0
0
*
0
.0
7
5
*
0
.0
2
2
-
0
.1
0
6
*
0
.0
4
9
0
.2
0
2
*
-
0
.2
8
1
*
1
.0
0
0
Ir
e
la
n
d
2
0
.6
7
2
0
-
0
.0
4
6
-
0
.0
7
2
-
0
.0
7
5
*
-
0
.0
2
3
-
0
.0
4
9
0
.0
7
9
*
-
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
4
6
-
0
.2
8
0
*
-
0
.2
6
0
*
1
.0
0
0
S
p
a
in
2
4
.0
7
2
0
-
0
.1
6
3
*
0
.1
1
3
*
0
.1
9
5
*
-
0
.1
1
2
*
0
.0
2
2
0
.0
9
9
*
0
.0
6
6
-
0
.1
4
4
*
-
0
.3
0
9
*
-
0
.2
8
7
*
-
0
.2
8
6
*
1
.0
0
0
D
e
n
m
a
rk
6
.5
7
2
0
0
.0
2
8
-
0
.0
6
2
0
.1
2
7
*
0
.0
4
5
-
0
.0
5
3
0
.0
0
8
-
0
.0
0
9
-
0
.0
5
5
-
0
.1
4
5
*
-
0
.1
3
5
*
-
0
.1
3
4
*
-
0
.1
4
9
*
1
.0
0
0
N
o
rw
a
y
5
.0
7
2
0
0
.0
3
4
0
.0
3
0
0
.1
3
1
*
0
.0
6
8
0
.0
2
0
-
0
.0
9
6
*
-
0
.0
3
4
-
0
.0
2
5
-
0
.1
2
6
*
-
0
.1
1
7
*
-
0
.1
1
7
*
-
0
.1
2
9
*
-
0
.0
6
1
1
.0
0
0
U
S
-
o
w
n
e
d
6
1
.7
7
2
0
0
.0
0
0
-
0
.3
3
4
*
-
0
.2
6
3
*
-
0
.3
3
3
*
0
.0
2
3
0
.3
4
3
*
0
.1
4
5
*
0
.2
5
7
*
0
.1
3
6
*
0
.1
0
0
*
0
.0
6
9
-
0
.1
1
2
*
-
0
.1
3
9
*
-
0
.1
9
9
*
1
.0
0
0
N
o
te
s:
*
C
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
0
.0
5
le
ve
l
(2
-t
a
ile
d
).
#
T
h
e
H
R
n
e
tw
o
rk
in
te
n
si
ty
is
a
m
e
a
n
.
11
T
a
b
le
4
R
e
g
re
ss
io
n
re
su
lt
s
–
a
p
p
ra
is
a
l
LO
G
M
a
n
a
g
e
rs
A
B
C
A
B
C
(a
)
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
S
e
ct
o
r
-
1
.1
4
6
(0
.2
2
8
)*
**
-
1
.1
8
4
(0
.2
4
2
)*
**
-
1
.2
1
0
(0
.2
5
2
)*
**
-
0
.2
7
4
(0
.3
4
4
)
-
0
.3
9
9
(0
.3
6
9
)
-
0
.2
5
6
(0
.3
9
1
)
S
u
b
si
d
ia
ry
si
ze
0
.0
7
4
(0
.2
0
9
)
0
.2
4
4
(0
.2
4
4
)
0
.3
6
4
(0
.2
5
3
)
0
.5
3
5
(0
.3
2
4
)*
0
.8
6
0
(0
.3
9
9
)*
*
0
.7
4
5
(0
.3
9
9
)*
U
n
io
n
p
re
se
n
ce
-
1
.6
7
6
(0
.2
6
5
)*
**
-
1
.5
9
6
(0
.2
8
1
)*
**
-
1
.6
1
4
(0
.2
8
3
)*
**
-
1
.0
1
9
(0
.4
0
6
)*
*
-
0
.3
8
2
(0
.4
2
8
)
-
0
.4
0
7
(0
.4
6
0
)
W
W
si
ze
–
m
e
d
iu
m
0
.1
3
8
(0
.2
4
6
)
-
0
.0
2
7
(0
.2
6
8
)
-
0
.1
1
7
(0
.2
7
3
)
0
.3
7
6
(0
.3
4
7
)
0
.1
2
5
(0
.3
9
8
)
0
.2
8
4
(0
.4
2
9
)
W
W
si
ze
–
la
rg
e
0
.3
3
1
(0
.2
8
2
)
0
.0
0
0
(0
.3
3
2
)
-
0
.2
7
5
(0
.3
5
3
)
1
.3
9
3
(0
.6
8
3
)*
*
0
.9
6
6
(0
.7
1
0
)
1
.0
2
6
(0
.7
3
7
)
In
t’
l
H
R
co
m
m
it
te
e
0
.9
1
4
(0
.2
1
4
)*
**
0
.9
3
4
(0
.2
1
7
)*
**
0
.9
3
7
(0
.2
1
8
)*
**
1
.5
8
5
(0
.3
3
7
)*
**
1
.6
6
0
(0
.3
3
4
)*
**
1
.5
7
3
(0
.3
4
6
)*
**
In
t’
l
H
R
N
e
tw
o
rk
0
.0
7
7
(0
.0
7
7
)
0
.0
9
2
(0
.0
8
1
)
0
.0
8
5
(0
.0
8
3
)
0
.3
2
3
(0
.1
3
5
)*
*
0
.2
8
6
(0
.1
4
7
)*
0
.2
6
4
(0
.1
5
4
)*
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
(r
e
f
ca
t:
D
e
n
/N
o
r)
U
K
0
.2
7
3
(0
.3
9
6
)
1
.8
8
5
(0
.7
6
3
)*
*
2
.2
4
0
(0
.6
0
1
)*
**
C
a
n
a
d
a
-
0
.5
4
6
(0
.3
8
8
)
0
.0
5
0
(0
.5
4
2
)
1
.2
0
8
(0
.5
6
8
)*
*
0
.7
8
8
(0
.6
5
8
)
Ir
e
la
n
d
-
0
.2
3
3
(0
.3
6
9
)
-
0
.2
4
5
(0
.4
8
2
)
1
.2
9
1
(0
.4
9
9
)*
*
1
.1
7
3
(0
.6
0
6
)*
S
p
a
in
-
0
.2
2
3
(0
.3
6
2
)
-
0
.1
8
5
(0
.4
4
7
)
0
.5
4
1
(0
.4
4
6
)
0
.7
8
7
(0
.5
2
5
)
O
ri
g
in U
S
o
w
n
e
d
0
.4
2
3
(0
.2
7
3
)
1
.9
1
1
(0
.8
7
8
)*
*
0
.5
0
9
(0
.4
4
0
)
0
.9
4
0
(0
.8
3
9
)
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
s
h
o
st
9
U
S
o
w
(r
e
f
ca
t:
(D
e
n
/N
o
r)
9
U
S
o
w
)
U
K
9
U
S
o
w
n
e
d
-
3
.1
7
1
(1
.1
2
1
)*
**
C
a
n
a
d
a
9
U
S
o
w
n
e
d
-
1
.9
0
0
(0
.9
5
3
)*
*
0
.4
4
1
(1
.1
1
5
)
Ir
e
la
n
d
9
U
S
o
w
n
e
d
-
0
.9
0
5
(0
.9
2
4
)
0
.0
1
6
(1
.0
8
8
)
S
p
a
in
9
U
S
o
w
n
e
d
-
0
.7
8
0
(0
.9
0
7
)
-
0
.9
4
9
(0
.9
6
0
)
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
2
.1
6
9
(0
.3
2
0
)*
**
2
.0
9
5
(0
.4
5
1
)*
**
1
.8
6
6
(0
.4
9
1
)*
**
1
.5
1
4
(0
.3
5
0
)*
**
-
0
.0
2
1
(0
.5
4
1
)
-
0
.1
2
7
(0
.5
6
9
)
N
6
4
7
6
4
7
6
4
7
6
5
2
6
5
2
5
0
4
N
a
g
e
lk
e
rk
e
R
2
0
.2
6
5
0
.2
8
2
0
.3
1
1
0
.2
6
7
0
.3
3
5
0
.3
2
4
C
o
x
a
n
d
S
n
e
ll
R
2
0
.1
7
9
0
.1
9
1
0
.2
1
1
0
.1
2
0
0
.1
5
1
0
.1
6
0
M
o
d
e
l
si
g
1
0
4
.4
3
**
*
1
0
9
.3
4
**
*
1
1
6
.6
2
**
*
6
4
.2
0
**
*
9
6
.5
8
**
*
7
3
.9
8
**
*
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
e
rr
o
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
e
se
s.
(a
)
U
K
n
o
t
in
cl
u
d
e
d
(n
o
va
ri
a
b
ili
ty
o
f
th
is
p
ra
ct
ic
e
fo
r
in
d
ig
e
n
o
u
s
fi
rm
s
in
U
K
,
se
e
T
a
b
le
2
).
**
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
1
%
le
ve
l;
**
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
5
%
le
ve
l;
*
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
1
0
%
le
ve
l.
12
T
a
b
le
5
R
e
g
re
ss
io
n
re
su
lt
s
–
fo
rc
e
d
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
LO
G
M
a
n
a
g
e
rs
A
B
C
A
B
C
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
S
e
ct
o
r
-
0
.8
1
4
(0
.2
1
2
)*
**
-
0
.7
3
1
(0
.2
1
7
)*
**
-
0
.7
9
0
(0
.2
1
5
)*
**
-
0
.1
9
1
(0
.1
9
0
)
-
0
.1
8
8
(0
.1
9
6
)
-
0
.2
2
3
(0
.1
9
7
)
S
u
b
si
d
ia
ry
si
ze
-
0
.4
9
3
(0
.2
2
2
)*
*
-
0
.2
3
8
(0
.2
5
2
)
-
0
.2
6
8
(0
.2
5
7
)
-
0
.4
1
5
(0
.1
9
9
)*
*
-
0
.1
7
7
(0
.2
2
8
)
-
0
.2
3
4
(0
.2
3
1
)
U
n
io
n
p
re
se
n
ce
-
0
.6
3
5
(0
.2
1
4
)*
**
-
0
.8
5
4
(0
.2
4
3
)*
**
-
0
.8
0
4
(0
.2
4
7
)*
**
-
0
.5
2
2
(0
.1
9
6
)*
**
-
0
.6
4
2
(0
.2
1
6
)*
**
-
0
.6
3
4
(0
.2
2
2
)*
**
W
W
si
ze
–
m
e
d
iu
m
0
.2
3
8
(0
.2
5
8
)
0
.1
0
1
(0
.2
6
8
)
0
.0
8
7
(0
.2
7
2
)
0
.3
3
7
(0
.2
3
2
)
0
.2
4
2
(0
.2
4
8
)
0
.2
5
7
(0
.2
5
2
)
W
W
si
ze
–
la
rg
e
0
.8
1
6
(0
.2
6
4
)*
**
0
.5
1
8
(0
.3
0
2
)*
0
.5
0
1
(0
.3
1
3
)
0
.8
7
0
(0
.2
4
8
)*
**
0
.6
7
7
(0
.2
9
7
)*
*
0
.7
6
3
(0
.3
0
5
)*
*
In
t’
l
H
R
co
m
m
it
te
e
0
.2
4
9
(0
.2
4
1
)
0
.1
8
0
(0
.2
4
3
)
0
.1
8
7
(0
.2
5
2
)
0
.4
8
2
(0
.2
2
0
)*
*
0
.4
4
2
(0
.2
2
4
)*
*
0
.4
3
4
(0
.2
2
9
)*
In
t’
l
H
R
n
e
tw
o
rk
0
.2
0
6
(0
.0
7
9
)*
*
0
.2
2
1
(0
.0
8
4
)*
**
0
.2
2
1
(0
.0
8
6
)*
*
0
.2
0
8
(0
.0
7
1
)*
**
0
.1
9
0
(0
.0
7
6
)*
*
0
.2
0
6
(0
.0
7
8
)*
**
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
(r
e
f
ca
t:
D
e
n
/N
o
r)
U
K
-
1
.4
2
0
(0
.4
4
3
)*
**
-
1
.7
1
2
(0
.7
8
5
)*
*
-
1
.3
0
8
(0
.3
9
1
)*
**
-
1
.6
4
9
(0
.6
6
6
)*
*
C
a
n
a
d
a
-
1
.1
4
5
(0
.4
2
6
)*
**
-
1
.0
1
4
(0
.6
7
9
)
-
0
.7
1
3
(0
.3
7
0
)*
-
1
.4
4
0
(0
.6
1
8
)*
*
Ir
e
la
n
d
-
0
.9
7
7
(0
.4
0
2
)*
*
-
2
.0
3
1
(0
.8
1
8
)*
*
-
0
.7
9
6
(0
.3
6
4
)*
*
-
1
.2
5
5
(0
.6
0
8
)*
*
S
p
a
in
-
0
.5
7
6
(0
.3
9
7
)
-
0
.4
6
7
(0
.5
1
8
)
-
0
.6
8
3
(0
.3
6
3
)*
-
0
.3
5
4
(0
.4
4
6
)
O
ri
g
in U
S
o
w
n
e
d
0
.5
4
1
(0
.2
8
3
)*
0
.2
5
5
(0
.6
8
2
)
0
.4
5
5
(0
.2
5
9
)*
0
.0
6
8
(0
.6
2
9
)
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
s
h
o
st
9
U
S
o
w
(r
e
f
ca
t:
(D
e
n
/N
o
r)
9
U
S
o
w
)
U
K
9
U
S
o
w
n
e
d
0
.5
5
2
(0
.9
6
0
)
0
.6
5
2
(0
.8
6
0
)
C
a
n
a
d
a
9
U
S
o
w
n
e
d
0
.0
4
5
(0
.8
9
6
)
1
.1
4
4
(0
.8
2
2
)
Ir
e
la
n
d
9
U
S
o
w
n
e
d
1
.4
1
4
(0
.9
9
4
)
0
.7
8
1
(0
.8
1
7
)
S
p
a
in
9
U
S
o
w
n
e
d
-
0
.0
4
2
(0
.7
7
5
)
-
0
.4
0
8
(0
.7
1
2
)
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
-
1
.2
0
2
(0
.2
7
5
)*
**
-
0
.5
3
9
(0
.4
2
8
)
-
0
.4
4
4
(0
.4
8
4
)
-
1
.4
0
6
(0
.2
4
5
)*
**
-
0
.8
0
7
(0
.3
8
3
)*
*
-
0
.7
0
6
(0
.4
2
8
)
N
6
3
3
6
3
3
6
3
3
6
3
4
6
3
4
6
3
4
N
a
g
e
lk
e
rk
e
R
2
0
.1
6
2
0
.1
9
1
0
.1
9
9
0
.1
3
2
0
.1
5
8
0
.1
7
3
C
o
x
a
n
d
S
n
e
ll
R
2
0
.1
0
6
0
.1
2
5
0
.1
3
0
0
.0
9
3
0
.1
1
1
0
.1
2
2
M
o
d
e
l
si
g
5
7
.4
9
**
*
7
0
.7
4
**
*
7
3
.7
3
**
*
5
1
.5
8
**
*
6
4
.1
6
**
*
6
9
.0
4
**
*
N
o
te
s:
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
e
rr
o
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
e
se
s.
**
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
1
%
le
ve
l;
**
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
5
%
le
ve
l;
*
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
1
0
%
le
ve
l.
13
T
a
b
le
6
R
e
g
re
ss
io
n
re
su
lt
s
–
p
a
y
lin
ke
d
to
p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
ce
LO
G
M
a
n
a
g
e
rs
A
B
C
A
B
C
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
S
e
ct
o
r
-
0
.3
9
8
(0
.1
8
5
)*
*
-
0
.3
1
3
(0
.1
9
5
)
-
0
.2
8
8
(0
.1
9
9
)
-
0
.5
2
9
(0
.3
1
9
)*
-
0
.4
3
3
(0
.3
4
8
)
-
0
.5
5
6
(0
.3
4
1
)
S
u
b
si
d
ia
ry
si
ze
-
0
.1
6
0
(0
.1
8
6
)
-
0
.2
6
4
(0
.2
1
3
)
-
0
.2
2
6
(0
.2
1
6
)
0
.3
8
1
(0
.3
4
2
)
0
.0
6
4
(0
.3
8
8
)
-
0
.0
3
2
(0
.3
9
2
)
U
n
io
n
p
re
se
n
ce
-
0
.8
6
2
(0
.2
0
3
)*
**
-
0
.8
6
0
(0
.2
1
8
)*
**
-
0
.8
9
6
(0
.2
2
4
)*
**
0
.1
7
0
(0
.3
3
3
)
0
.3
2
9
(0
.3
7
7
)
0
.4
1
9
(0
.3
9
2
)
W
W
si
ze
–
m
e
d
iu
m
0
.1
9
3
(0
.2
0
8
)
0
.1
8
3
(0
.2
2
6
)
0
.1
6
9
(0
.2
2
5
)
-
0
.0
9
9
(0
.3
3
8
)
-
0
.1
2
8
(0
.3
6
3
)
-
0
.0
9
4
(0
.3
6
5
)
W
W
si
ze
–
la
rg
e
0
.7
1
9
(0
.2
5
3
)*
**
0
.6
7
2
(0
.2
9
9
)*
*
0
.5
9
7
(0
.2
9
9
)*
*
0
.4
5
9
(0
.4
6
2
)
0
.5
0
7
(0
.4
9
3
)
0
.6
8
5
(0
.4
9
7
)
In
t’
l
H
R
co
m
m
it
te
e
-
0
.1
7
4
(0
.2
0
0
)
-
0
.1
8
7
(0
.2
0
2
)
-
0
.1
8
4
(0
.2
0
3
)
0
.4
2
0
(0
.3
2
5
)
0
.3
5
2
(0
.3
4
7
)
0
.4
1
7
(0
.3
4
2
)
In
t’
l
H
R
n
e
tw
o
rk
0
.1
4
2
(0
.0
6
8
)*
*
0
.2
0
6
(0
.0
7
3
)*
**
0
.1
9
7
(0
.0
7
5
)*
**
0
.1
8
4
(0
.1
1
9
)
0
.2
5
1
(0
.1
2
7
)*
*
0
.2
3
6
(0
.1
2
7
)*
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
(r
e
f
ca
t:
D
e
n
/N
o
r)
U
K
0
.5
9
0
(0
.3
5
0
)*
0
.7
7
0
(0
.4
8
5
)
1
.7
2
7
(0
.5
4
6
)*
**
0
.7
9
2
(0
.6
6
3
)
C
a
n
a
d
a
-
0
.4
4
4
(0
.3
4
3
)
0
.0
1
9
(0
.4
8
5
)
1
.2
9
1
(0
.5
0
4
)*
*
1
.3
4
2
(0
.8
6
4
)
Ir
e
la
n
d
0
.0
1
9
(0
.3
3
4
)
0
.3
0
3
(0
.4
5
6
)
0
.9
9
2
(0
.4
6
9
)*
*
0
.5
8
9
(0
.5
7
0
)
S
p
a
in
0
.2
0
7
(0
.3
1
4
)
0
.1
2
0
(0
.3
7
7
)
2
.3
8
0
(0
.5
9
8
)*
**
2
.9
7
3
(1
.0
8
5
)*
**
O
ri
g
in U
S
o
w
n
e
d
-
0
.0
9
4
(0
.2
4
5
)
0
.4
3
4
(0
.6
4
7
)
-
0
.3
8
9
(0
.4
2
7
)
-
1
.2
0
4
(0
.7
3
7
)
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
s
h
o
st
9
U
S
o
w
(r
e
f
ca
t:
(D
e
n
/N
o
r)
9
U
S
o
w
)
U
K
9
U
S
o
w
n
e
d
-
0
.6
2
3
(0
.7
7
0
)
1
.9
4
1
(0
.9
5
7
)*
*
C
a
n
a
d
a
9
U
S
o
w
n
e
d
-
1
.0
0
8
(0
.7
6
3
)
0
.5
4
5
(1
.0
8
4
)
Ir
e
la
n
d
9
U
S
o
w
n
e
d
-
0
.7
6
9
(0
.7
6
5
)
1
.1
0
8
(0
.9
4
1
)
S
p
a
in
9
U
S
o
w
n
e
d
-
0
.0
1
4
(0
.7
1
6
)
-
0
.5
4
8
(1
.3
4
1
)
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
1
.1
4
9
(0
.2
4
3
)*
**
1
.0
2
1
(0
.3
6
2
)*
**
0
.9
2
7
(0
.3
8
9
)*
*
1
.8
9
0
(0
.3
4
9
)*
**
0
.7
9
1
(0
.4
8
9
)
0
.9
9
6
(0
.5
0
6
)*
*
N
6
3
9
6
3
9
6
3
9
6
4
3
6
4
3
6
4
3
N
a
g
e
lk
e
rk
e
R
2
0
.1
1
3
0
.1
4
0
0
.1
4
8
0
.0
5
8
0
.1
3
5
0
.1
5
3
C
o
x
a
n
d
S
n
e
ll
R
2
0
.0
8
2
0
.1
0
1
0
.1
0
7
0
.0
2
5
0
.0
5
8
0
.0
6
6
M
o
d
e
l
si
g
5
1
.4
2
**
*
6
2
.6
9
**
*
6
7
.1
7
**
*
1
4
.8
9
**
3
4
.9
4
**
*
4
2
.5
7
**
*
N
o
te
s:
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
e
rr
o
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
e
se
s.
**
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
1
%
le
ve
l;
**
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
5
%
le
ve
l;
*
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
1
0
%
le
ve
l.
14
T
a
b
le
7
R
e
g
re
ss
io
n
re
su
lt
s
–
a
ll
o
u
tc
o
m
e
va
ri
a
b
le
s
(v
a
ri
a
ti
o
n
w
it
h
in
co
u
n
tr
ie
s)
A
p
p
ra
is
a
l
A
p
p
ra
is
a
l
Fo
rc
e
d
d
is
tr
ib
.
Fo
rc
e
d
d
is
tr
ib
.
V
a
ri
a
b
le
p
a
y
V
a
ri
a
b
le
p
a
y
LO
G
(a
)
M
a
n
a
g
e
rs
(b
)
LO
G
(a
)
M
a
n
a
g
e
rs
(b
)
LO
G
(a
)
M
a
n
a
g
e
rs
(b
)
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
S
e
ct
o
r
-
1
.2
6
6
(0
.2
5
6
)*
**
-
0
.3
1
1
(0
.4
1
9
)
-
0
.7
8
9
(0
.2
1
7
)*
**
-
0
.2
8
6
(0
.1
9
9
)
-
0
.5
5
6
(0
.3
4
2
)
S
u
b
si
d
ia
ry
si
ze
0
.3
9
4
(0
.2
6
4
)
0
.7
3
7
(0
.4
3
0
)*
-
0
.3
1
7
(0
.2
6
0
)
-
0
.2
1
5
(0
.1
9
8
)
-
0
.2
6
0
(0
.2
3
3
)
-
0
.2
2
7
(0
.2
1
7
)
-
0
.0
2
2
(0
.4
0
0
)
U
n
io
n
p
re
se
n
ce
-
1
.6
1
(0
.2
8
8
)*
**
-
0
.5
1
5
(0
.4
9
5
)
-
0
.8
2
3
(0
.2
4
8
)*
**
-
0
.6
4
2
(0
.2
2
2
)*
**
-
0
.8
9
6
(0
.2
2
5
)*
**
0
.4
2
7
(0
.3
9
4
)
W
W
si
ze
–
m
e
d
iu
m
-
0
.1
5
4
(0
.2
8
2
)
0
.2
6
6
(0
.4
6
4
)
0
.0
7
8
(0
.2
7
5
)
0
.2
5
2
(0
.2
5
3
)
0
.1
6
7
(0
.2
2
6
)
-
0
.0
9
5
(0
.3
6
6
)
W
W
si
ze
–
la
rg
e
-
0
.3
1
9
(0
.3
6
2
)
1
.0
3
2
(0
.7
7
3
)
0
.5
4
1
(0
.3
1
7
)*
0
.7
8
4
(0
.3
0
9
)*
*
0
.5
8
8
(0
.3
0
1
)*
0
.6
4
0
(0
.5
0
4
)
In
t’
l
H
R
co
m
m
it
te
e
0
.9
6
7
(0
.2
2
6
)*
**
1
.8
1
1
(0
.3
9
0
)*
**
0
.2
0
7
(0
.2
5
1
)
0
.4
4
1
(0
.2
2
9
)*
-
0
.1
8
6
(0
.2
0
3
)
0
.4
0
7
(0
.3
4
7
)
In
t’
l
H
R
n
e
tw
o
rk
0
.1
1
(0
.0
8
6
)
0
.3
2
7
(0
.1
6
5
)*
*
0
.2
1
5
(0
.0
8
6
)*
*
0
.2
0
4
(0
.0
7
8
)*
**
0
.1
9
9
(0
.0
7
5
)*
**
0
.2
4
6
(0
.1
2
9
)*
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
s
h
o
st
9
U
S
o
w
n
e
d
U
K
9
U
S
o
w
n
e
d
R
e
f.
ca
te
g
o
ry
R
e
f.
ca
te
g
o
ry
R
e
f.
ca
te
g
o
ry
R
e
f.
ca
te
g
o
ry
R
e
f.
ca
te
g
o
ry
C
a
n
9
U
S
o
w
n
e
d
-
0
.5
7
6
(0
.3
8
1
)
R
e
f.
ca
te
g
o
ry
0
.1
8
8
(0
.3
6
1
)
0
.6
9
8
(0
.3
2
4
)*
*
-
1
.1
3
8
(0
.3
3
3
)*
**
-
0
.8
5
0
(0
.5
7
5
)
Ir
e
9
U
S
o
w
n
e
d
0
.1
3
(0
.4
1
7
)
-
0
.0
2
2
(0
.8
6
2
)
0
.5
2
7
(0
.3
4
7
)
0
.5
1
4
(0
.3
1
8
)
-
0
.6
1
3
(0
.3
4
1
)*
-
1
.0
3
0
(0
.5
6
5
)*
S
p
9
U
S
o
w
n
e
d
0
.3
1
6
(0
.4
5
8
)
-
1
.4
1
8
(0
.7
9
3
)*
0
.6
3
5
(0
.3
9
7
)
0
.2
2
8
(0
.3
7
2
)
-
0
.0
3
8
(0
.3
8
6
)
-
0
.2
9
8
(0
.7
2
8
)
D
e
n
9
U
S
o
w
n
e
d
0
.8
1
9
(0
.8
3
7
)
-
1
.8
3
7
(0
.8
8
8
)*
*
0
.6
7
7
(0
.7
0
7
)
0
.7
1
3
(0
.6
5
5
)
0
.0
0
7
(0
.7
6
3
)
-
2
.5
3
8
(0
.8
7
8
)*
**
N
o
r
9
U
S
o
w
n
e
d
1
.9
9
5
(0
.9
3
2
)*
*
1
.5
4
1
(0
.9
4
5
)
-
0
.4
1
5
(0
.9
4
6
)
-
3
.0
5
1
(1
.1
4
7
)*
**
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
s
in
d
ig
e
n
o
u
s
M
N
C
s
U
K
9
U
K
o
w
n
e
d
1
.2
6
9
(0
.7
4
)*
-
0
.7
9
0
(0
.6
9
4
)
-
0
.7
0
9
(0
.5
9
9
)
0
.1
9
0
(0
.4
6
3
)
-
0
.7
3
7
(0
.7
1
8
)
C
a
n
9
C
a
n
o
w
n
e
d
-
0
.6
0
9
(0
.5
2
3
)
-
1
.3
7
1
(0
.8
4
8
)
-
0
.0
8
6
(0
.6
0
3
)
-
0
.5
0
1
(0
.5
6
8
)
-
0
.5
6
5
(0
.4
6
9
)
-
0
.2
0
3
(0
.9
5
6
)
Ir
e
9
Ir
e
o
w
n
e
d
-
0
.8
9
3
(0
.4
4
6
)*
*
-
0
.9
0
1
(0
.7
6
8
)
-
1
.1
0
5
(0
.7
7
1
)
-
0
.3
1
3
(0
.5
6
8
)
-
0
.2
7
9
(0
.4
5
1
)
-
0
.9
4
6
(0
.7
0
8
)
S
p
9
S
p
o
w
n
e
d
-
0
.8
2
4
(0
.4
0
6
)*
*
-
1
.2
6
6
(0
.7
6
8
)*
0
.4
6
5
(0
.4
5
7
)
0
.5
8
9
(0
.3
9
9
)
-
0
.4
6
0
(0
.3
6
2
)
1
.4
3
9
(1
.1
6
0
)
D
k
9
D
k
o
w
n
e
d
-
1
.2
7
7
(0
.5
7
1
)*
*
-
2
.4
8
8
(0
.8
0
8
)*
**
0
.2
1
3
(0
.7
4
5
)
0
.4
6
9
(0
.5
9
3
)
-
0
.7
6
8
(0
.4
7
4
)
-
1
.5
6
4
(0
.6
8
0
)*
*
N
o
r
9
N
o
r
o
w
n
e
d
1
.4
9
2
(0
.6
3
2
)*
*
1
.3
3
6
(0
.5
6
1
)*
*
-
0
.3
7
3
(0
.5
1
4
)
-
1
.5
0
4
(0
.7
4
4
)*
*
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
2
.4
9
(0
.4
2
7
)*
**
1
.9
7
7
(0
.7
1
5
)*
**
-
1
.3
3
2
(0
.3
5
9
)*
**
-
1
.6
2
9
(0
.3
2
2
)*
**
1
.5
0
7
(0
.3
3
8
)*
**
2
.5
1
6
(0
.5
3
5
)*
**
N
6
1
6
4
7
2
6
3
3
6
3
4
6
3
9
6
4
3
N
a
g
e
lk
e
rk
e
R
2
0
.3
2
9
0
.3
6
5
0
.2
0
8
0
.1
7
7
0
.1
5
0
0
.1
5
3
C
o
x
a
n
d
S
n
e
ll
R
2
0
.2
2
3
0
.1
7
6
0
.1
3
6
0
.1
2
5
0
.1
0
8
0
.0
6
7
M
o
d
e
l
si
g
1
1
6
.2
2
**
*
6
7
.9
7
**
*
7
7
.4
0
**
*
7
2
.5
9
**
*
6
7
.2
8
**
*
4
2
.5
0
**
*
N
o
te
s:
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
e
rr
o
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
e
se
s.
(a
)
N
o
rw
a
y
n
o
t
in
cl
u
d
e
d
(n
o
va
ri
a
b
ili
ty
o
f
th
is
p
ra
ct
ic
e
fo
r
U
S
fi
rm
s
in
N
o
rw
a
y
,
se
e
T
a
b
le
2
).
(b
)
U
K
a
n
d
N
o
rw
a
y
n
o
t
in
cl
u
d
e
d
(n
o
va
ri
a
b
ili
ty
o
f
th
is
p
ra
ct
ic
e
fo
r
in
d
ig
e
n
o
u
s
fi
rm
s
in
U
K
a
n
d
U
S
fi
rm
s
in
N
o
rw
a
y
,
se
e
T
a
b
le
2
).
**
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
1
%
le
ve
l;
**
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
5
%
le
ve
l,
*
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
1
0
%
le
ve
l.
15
T
a
b
le
8
D
if
fe
re
n
ce
s
in
th
e
ta
ke
-u
p
o
f
P
M
p
ra
ct
ic
e
s
A
p
p
ra
is
a
l
A
p
p
ra
is
a
l
Fo
rc
e
d
d
is
tr
ib
.
Fo
rc
e
d
d
is
tr
ib
.
V
a
ri
a
b
le
p
a
y
V
a
ri
a
b
le
p
a
y
LO
G
M
a
n
a
g
e
rs
LO
G
M
a
n
a
g
e
rs
LO
G
M
a
n
a
g
e
rs
D
if
fe
re
n
ce
s
a
cr
o
ss
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
U
K
vs
D
e
n
-N
o
r
0
.0
3
7
(0
.0
5
4
)
0
.1
4
3
(0
.0
4
1
)*
**
-
0
.2
2
9
(0
.0
7
6
)*
**
-
0
.2
4
9
(0
.0
7
5
)*
**
0
.1
1
4
(0
.0
6
9
)*
0
.1
7
5
(0
.0
6
2
)*
**
C
a
n
a
d
a
vs
D
e
n
-N
o
r
-
0
.0
8
5
(0
.0
5
9
)
0
.1
0
1
(0
.0
4
9
)*
*
-
0
.1
9
4
(0
.0
7
6
)*
**
-
0
.1
4
7
(0
.0
7
7
)*
-
0
.0
9
7
(0
.0
7
4
)
0
.1
4
9
(0
.0
6
3
)*
*
Ir
e
la
n
d
vs
D
e
n
-N
o
r
-
0
.0
3
5
(0
.0
5
4
)
0
.1
0
5
(0
.0
4
4
)*
*
-
0
.1
7
1
(0
.0
7
4
)*
*
-
0
.1
6
2
(0
.0
7
5
)*
*
0
.0
0
4
(0
.0
7
0
)
0
.1
2
5
(0
.0
6
4
)*
*
S
p
a
in
vs
D
e
n
-N
o
r
-
0
.0
3
3
(0
.0
5
3
)
0
.0
5
3
(0
.0
4
5
)
-
0
.1
0
7
(0
.0
7
6
)
-
0
.1
4
1
(0
.0
7
6
)*
0
.0
4
2
(0
.0
6
5
)
0
.1
9
9
(0
.0
5
6
)*
**
D
if
fe
re
n
ce
s
a
cr
o
ss
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
in
th
e
d
o
m
e
st
ic
o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
s
U
K
vs
D
e
n
-N
o
r
0
.2
3
1
(0
.0
7
7
)*
**
-
0
.2
3
5
(0
.0
9
8
)*
*
-
0
.2
8
2
(0
.1
0
0
)*
**
0
.1
4
8
(0
.0
9
0
)
0
.0
8
0
(0
.0
6
2
)
C
a
n
a
d
a
vs
D
e
n
-N
o
r
0
.0
0
8
(0
.0
9
2
)
0
.0
8
7
(0
.0
7
0
)
-
0
.1
6
4
(0
.1
0
5
)
-
0
.2
5
7
(0
.1
0
0
)*
*
0
.0
0
4
(0
.1
0
3
)
0
.1
1
4
(0
.0
5
9
)*
Ir
e
la
n
d
vs
D
e
n
-N
o
r
-
0
.0
4
3
(0
.0
8
4
)
0
.1
1
9
(0
.0
6
1
)*
-
0
.2
5
9
(0
.0
9
2
)*
**
-
0
.2
3
2
(0
.1
0
4
)*
*
0
.0
6
2
(0
.0
9
3
)
0
.0
6
4
(0
.0
6
0
)
S
p
a
in
vs
D
e
n
-N
o
r
-
0
.0
3
2
(0
.0
7
8
)
0
.0
8
7
(0
.0
5
8
)
-
0
.0
8
4
(0
.0
9
5
)
-
0
.0
7
5
(0
.0
9
5
)
0
.0
2
5
(0
.0
8
0
)
0
.1
5
4
(0
.0
4
8
)*
**
D
if
fe
re
n
ce
s
a
cr
o
ss
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
in
U
S
M
N
C
s
U
K
vs
D
e
n
-N
o
r
-
0
.1
3
5
(0
.0
6
5
)*
*
-
0
.2
0
0
(0
.1
1
6
)*
-
0
.1
9
7
(0
.1
2
0
)*
0
.0
2
7
(0
.1
1
6
)
0
.3
3
3
(0
.1
3
5
)*
*
C
a
n
a
d
a
vs
D
e
n
-N
o
r
-
0
.2
2
3
(0
.0
6
8
)*
**
0
.0
7
1
(0
.0
6
3
)
-
0
.1
7
3
(0
.1
1
6
)
-
0
.0
6
4
(0
.1
2
2
)
-
0
.2
1
1
(0
.1
1
9
)*
0
.2
8
3
(0
.1
3
6
)*
*
Ir
e
la
n
d
vs
D
e
n
-N
o
r
-
0
.1
1
6
(0
.0
6
4
)*
0
.0
7
0
(0
.0
6
2
)
-
0
.1
1
7
(0
.1
1
5
)
-
0
.1
0
0
(0
.1
1
8
)
-
0
.0
9
5
(0
.1
1
8
)
0
.2
6
6
(0
.1
3
9
)*
S
p
a
in
vs
D
e
n
-N
o
r
-
0
.0
9
2
(0
.0
6
5
)
-
0
.0
1
4
(0
.0
6
8
)
-
0
.0
9
8
(0
.1
1
6
)
-
0
.1
5
6
(0
.1
1
9
)
0
.0
2
0
(0
.1
1
6
)
0
.3
1
9
(0
.1
3
7
)*
*
D
if
fe
re
n
ce
s
b
e
tw
e
e
n
U
S
M
N
C
s
a
n
d
in
d
ig
e
n
o
u
s
M
N
C
s
in
e
a
ch
co
u
n
tr
y
D
if
f.
in
U
K
-
0
.1
3
0
(0
.0
6
0
)*
*
0
.0
8
4
(0
.0
6
3
)
0
.0
9
9
(0
.0
7
3
)
-
0
.0
3
3
(0
.0
7
8
)
0
.0
4
2
(0
.0
4
6
)
D
if
f.
in
C
a
n
a
d
a
0
.0
0
5
(0
.0
8
7
)
0
.0
8
2
(0
.0
5
5
)
0
.0
3
8
(0
.0
7
8
)
0
.2
0
6
(0
.0
8
2
)*
*
-
0
.1
2
7
(0
.0
9
7
)
-
0
.0
4
1
(0
.0
5
1
)
D
if
f.
in
Ir
e
la
n
d
0
.1
6
0
(0
.0
7
9
)*
*
0
.0
4
5
(0
.0
4
1
)
0
.1
8
8
(0
.0
6
4
)*
**
0
.1
4
3
(0
.0
8
9
)
-
0
.0
6
9
(0
.0
9
4
)
-
0
.0
0
8
(0
.0
5
9
)
D
if
f.
in
S
p
a
in
0
.1
7
1
(0
.0
7
1
)*
*
-
0
.0
1
3
(0
.0
6
0
)
0
.0
2
9
(0
.0
8
0
)
-
0
.0
7
0
(0
.0
8
1
)
0
.0
8
3
(0
.0
7
9
)
-
0
.0
4
6
(0
.0
3
3
)
D
if
f.
in
D
e
n
m
a
rk
0
.3
0
7
(0
.1
2
3
)*
*
0
.0
7
8
(0
.1
0
6
)
0
.0
7
6
(0
.1
5
5
)
0
.0
5
0
(0
.1
6
7
)
0
.1
5
7
(0
.1
5
8
)
-
0
.1
6
6
(0
.1
7
3
)
D
if
f.
in
N
o
rw
a
y
0
.1
0
8
(0
.2
2
0
)
0
.0
4
6
(0
.2
2
7
)
-
0
.0
0
9
(0
.2
0
7
)
-
0
.2
8
4
(0
.2
3
4
)
N
o
te
s:
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
e
rr
o
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
e
se
s
co
m
p
u
te
d
th
ro
u
g
h
th
e
D
e
lt
a
m
e
th
o
d
(a
)
U
K
n
o
t
in
cl
u
d
e
d
;
(b
) N
o
rw
a
y
n
o
t
in
cl
u
d
e
d
;
(c
) U
K
a
n
d
N
o
rw
a
y
n
o
t
in
cl
u
d
e
d
.
S
e
e
co
m
m
e
n
ts
to
T
a
b
le
s
4
a
n
d
7
.
**
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
1
%
le
ve
l;
**
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
5
%
le
ve
l;
*
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
1
0
%
le
ve
l
16
practice.) For forced distributions, the results
revealed significant differences between those in
the Nordic area and those in the UK, Ireland and
Canada but in the opposite direction to that
hypothesized. Overall, there is very little support
for H2a–c.
The third panel of Table 4, 5, 6 and 7 reports the
results for the differences in the take-up of PM
practices of US MNCs across countries. US MNCs
in the Nordic area are significantly less likely to
have variable pay for managers compared with
those in all four of the other countries. In
contrast, they are significantly more likely than
those in the UK, Canada and Ireland to have
appraisal for the LOG, more likely than those in
the UK to have forced distribution for the LOG
and for managers, and more likely than those in
Canada to have variable pay for the LOG. All of
the other comparisons were insignificant. Overall,
where there are significant differences these are
not systematically in one or other direction, while
there are a large number of insignificant differ-
ences. This largely confirms our starting position
that US MNCs do not adapt their practices to
institutional constraints.
The differences in the take up of the practices
between US and indigenous MNCs in the six
countries are presented in the bottom panel of
Table 8, enabling us to test the third set of
hypotheses. In Canada US MNCs are more likely
than indigenous ones to have forced distributions
for managers, in Ireland they are more likely than
Irish MNCs to have appraisal for the LOG and
forced distribution for the LOG, and in Spain and
Denmark they are more likely than indigenous
ones to have appraisal for the LOG. Conversely, in
the UK US MNCs are less likely than British MNCs
to have appraisal for the LOG. In the main,
though, it is evident from Table 8 that the differ-
ences between US MNCs and indigenous ones are
largely insignificant and, in particular, the differ-
ences between the two groups are not more
evident in Denmark and Norway than in the
other countries. Hence, there is no support for
Hypotheses 3a–c.
DISCUSSION
The results provide only limited support for the
hypotheses and thus question the theoretical
approach based on the constraining effect of
cross-national differences, an approach which
underpins much scholarship in this area. Thus the
findings constitute a challenge to the conventional
way of framing comparative analysis of MNCs and
in making sense of them we return to the overar-
ching themes of standardization, differentiation
and heterogeneity of practices within countries.
Overall, the story is not primarily one of differ-
entiation created by institutional constraints. It is
not surprising that this shows through in the
analysis of US MNCs, where the results confirm
our expectations that the take-up of PM practices
across countries varies only partially. We argue that
this reflects the combination of dominance effects
and the way that US firms possess the organiza-
tional means with which to expand internationally
by extending domestic management structures to
other countries (Ferner et al., 2004). This has
allowed US MNCs to establish control over their
operations in other countries to a greater extent
than is the case in MNCs of most other nations and
to adopt a preferred set of practices that are largely
standardized across countries. It is more surprising,
however, that the hypotheses concerning cross-
national variation were not strongly supported,
either for MNCs as a whole (H1) or for indigenous
MNCs (H2). While some institutional analysis
points to homogenizing processes across borders,
the findings present challenges to the assumptions
of other strands of work informed by institutions.
In particular, they question the claims of Rosen-
zweig and Nohria (1994) concerning the primacy
of localization pressures and suggest that the
conventional wisdom of the constraining element
of institutions is overstated, at least for PM
practices.
However, neither is there full standardization.
There are some significant cross-national differ-
ences, indicating that the pressures of global com-
petition are not so strong as to result in the take-up
of PM practices being the same across countries.
These findings qualify some of the stronger claims
concerning standardization, such as Pudelko and
Harzing’s argument that ‘convergence to a world-
wide best practices model is clearly present’
(Pudelko & Harzing, 2007: 535). But if these
differences are not all due to institutional con-
straints – and the fact that some are in the opposite
direction to those hypothesized confirms that they
are not – what does cause them?
One interpretation is that the differences should
be seen not just as the result of institutional
constraints but also as the product of the strategiz-
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ing of senior actors in MNCs who use institutions as
resources to aid the introduction of new practices.
As observed earlier, MNCs do not operate in a single
organizational field and this gives them scope to
pick and choose parts of models and adapt them in
novel ways (Kostova et al., 2008). Moreover, actors
at senior level in MNCs can exploit the latitude that
exists within fields, using a particular institution to
gain acceptance to the implementation of new
practices to which other aspects of the institutional
context may not be conducive. The findings con-
cerning forced distributions – for which Nordic
MNCs have a significantly higher take-up than
indigenous MNCs in the other countries – are
intriguing in this respect. Whilst the Nordic
economies are certainly characterized by higher
union density and lower inequality, they are also
made up of mixed or hybrid institutions (e.g.
Campbell & Pedersen, 2007). In particular, some
argue that labour markets are structured such that
employees enjoy a high degree of security concern-
ing their employment and income prospects whilst
firms have considerable scope for flexibility and
experimentation, known as ‘flexicurity’ (Amable,
2003; Hagen & Trygstad, 2009; Kristensen & Mor-
gan, 2012). The greater use of forced distributions
in Nordic MNCs when compared with MNCs from
the other countries may be due to ‘flexicurity’. Such
practices may signal an attempt to drive forward a
stronger performance culture than hitherto in a
way that may provoke resistance from workers and
their representatives who fear that they will jeop-
ardize their job security. In the Nordic area, how-
ever, where employment and income security
(whether with their current employer or another
one) is strongly protected, forced distributions may
not constitute a threat. This suggests that an
institutional approach is indeed useful; institutions
are not merely constraints on management, but
rather should be seen as facilitating and promoting
certain practices at firm level (Jackson & Deeg,
2008), in this case the use of PM practices. In this
sense, we need both an actor-centred form of
institutionalism (Scharpf, 1997) and one that is
sensitive to distinct national contexts.
Turning to the issue of intra-national hetero-
geneity, how can we understand our findings? For
those practices where there are significant differ-
ences between US and indigenous firms it may be
that the two groups operate in different segments
of the institutional context. In Ireland US MNCs
more commonly appraise the individual
performance of the LOG and use forced distribu-
tions in evaluating the performance of the LOG,
but we do not find differences for managers. The
Irish results should be seen in the light of the
country’s industrial strategy, which has placed
great emphasis on attracting foreign capital with
public authorities creating a conducive institu-
tional environment that allows foreign MNCs to
operate with their desired practices, particularly the
‘tacit understanding of an MNC’s freedom to
establish operations in a union-free environment,
regardless of national partnership arrangements’
(Lamare, Gunnigle, Marginson, & Murray, 2013:
704). This clearly distinguishes them from the
fledgling indigenous multinational sector which is
seen as lagging behind more mature MNCs in the
‘sophistication’ of their practices (McDonnell,
Lavelle, & Gunnigle, 2014). Thus we might charac-
terize Ireland as consisting of distinct institutional
fields for the foreign and indigenous sectors, with
this showing up in differential take-up of practices
for the LOG. Where we do find such heterogeneity,
therefore, it may be that this is caused by the
differential way in which institutions affect the two
groups of firms.
The main finding, however, is that there is
relatively little evidence of differences between US
and indigenous MNCs in our six countries. One
part of the reason for this may have to do with
practices becoming very widespread among inter-
national firms such that they are part of a ‘global
way’ of doing things. Indeed, the evidence on
some of the practices, most notably individual
appraisal for managers which are extremely wide-
spread across both indigenous and US MNCs in all
the countries we examined, indicates that in both
groups of firms they have become part of the
taken-for-granted way of operating among MNCs,
regardless of national context. This part of the
explanation is consistent with a convergence view.
However, another part of the answer may be quite
different from the convergence explanation. This
is that institutions in highly regulated economies
can facilitate the introduction of PM practices in
subtle and unanticipated ways. As argued above,
the institutions that give rise to ‘flexicurity’ may
promote some of these practices in Nordic MNCs,
particularly forced distributions in indigenous
firms. It is quite possible that the institutions in
more deregulated economies such as the US
promote these practices in a different way –
namely that managers face less organized
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opposition to their introduction or operation –
and that these pressures from the home country of
US MNCs may be influential on their foreign
operations. The upshot appears to be that different
institutional configurations exerted on indigenous
and US firms may produce a similar incidence of
PM practices.
CONCLUSION
This article has been based on a dataset constructed
from a parallel series of national surveys of MNCs
and their employment practices. The national
comparisons have been between contrasting coun-
tries but within a manageable number, with the
data pertaining to particular practices and identifi-
able occupational groups. The surveys have permit-
ted a range of controls to be used and the
representativeness of the data is high. In method-
ological terms, therefore, the article has broken
new ground.
We have addressed two questions: (1) are there
differences in the take-up of PM practices across six
countries? and (2) are there significant differences
in the take-up of practices between indigenous and
US-owned MNCs in each of the countries? Regard-
ing the first question, we found that the take up of
PM practices varies only partially across countries,
and the variation we do observe cannot fully be
explained by institutional constraints. Rather than
rejecting an institutional approach outright, how-
ever, we argue that institutions can promote certain
practices at firm level in a differential way across
countries. In relation to the second question, there
is relatively little evidence of systematic differences
between indigenous and US firms, and a straight-
forward focus on the strength of institutional
constraints does not have analytical purchase.
While some practices, such as individual appraisal
for managers, are so widespread in MNCs that we
may see them as detached from institutional influ-
ences, this cannot be the whole story since most of
the practices are not employed universally. Once
again, we do not reject an institutionalist approach
outright but rather argue that it needs to be applied
in such a way that is sensitive to dual institutional
fields that exist within some economies and to the
subtle ways in which different national institu-
tional frameworks can, through quite different
processes, result in a similar take-up of practices
across countries. Thus we have argued for an actor-
centred form of institutionalism that is sensitive to
distinct national contexts.
This is significant theoretically because the
mainstream approach to the standardization–dif-
ferentiation issue has focused on nationally coher-
ent institutions and practices, sometimes through
the use of categories of business system, sometimes
through an overall measure or index of institutions
and practices at national level. What this misses is
that institutions do not simply constrain firms in
consistent ways across an economy; rather, insti-
tutions sometimes have partial coverage within
countries, they can promote the use of some
practices as opposed to simply constraining them,
and the impact of one institution may offset
another. For practitioners in MNCs, understanding
this diversity is a crucial consideration in such
issues as investment decisions. For example, while
an index or measure of national institutions may
suggest certain adaptations to local context are
necessary, in practice diverse patterns of practice
associated with regions within countries may allow
greater choice for MNCs.
Implications
Our study offers at least three implications for how
MNCs are studied. The first concerns whether
research should address particular practices or
group practices together into bundles. The evi-
dence strongly points to the need for disaggregated
analysis; the national effects took different forms
for the different practices, so we should be wary of
grouping practices together into categories. The
second is related to the first and concerns whether
we should examine particular countries or group
them into clusters. Our argument concerning the
subtle ways in which institutions operate in dis-
tinct national contexts indicates that researchers
should be wary of grouping countries into cate-
gories such as ‘liberal market economies’ as some
have argued (e.g. Morgan, 2009). The variations we
have analyzed are more nationally and practice
specific than that. Only where there are very strong
similarities in institutions across countries, as we
have argued is the case in the Nordic area, such
categories may be used, albeit with caution. The
third concerns the survey design. Many studies of
MNCs and HRM practices are based on secondary
data, often using surveys that were conducted
without a specific focus on MNCs, such as the
CRANET series. This approach makes sense in
many ways, not least that it facilitates analysis of
MNCs whilst avoiding the resource demands of
conducting a new survey. But it also entails draw-
backs; particularly that surveys that were not
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designed to look at MNCs tend not to contain data
on the wider firm of which the surveyed subsidiary
is a part. This means that the types of controls we
have used, and demonstrated to be important, are
not available. A major advance in our analysis
compared with previous work has been the ability
to control for several important influences on
employment policy and practice, such as sector,
the size of both subsidiaries and the wider compa-
nies, the presence of a trade union, and some
aspects of ‘strategic heterogeneity’. Evidently, there
are major advantages to carrying out bespoke
surveys focused on multinationals.
Limitations
There are, of course, limitations. In particular, the
surveys relied on a single respondent per firm.
Seeking two or more respondents in each firm
would inevitably have significantly increased the
cost and adversely affected the response rate. One
potential consequence of relying on a single
respondent is that it can lead to common method
variance in which bias is introduced through key
variables being derived from the same respondent
(Chang, Witteloostuijn, & Eden, 2010). As Pod-
sakoff, MacKenzie, and Lee (2003: 881) note, this is
likely to be ‘particularly problematic in those
situations in which respondents are asked to
provide retrospective accounts of their attitudes,
perceptions and/or behaviors’. In our study the
data were neither retrospective nor attitudinal;
rather, they were derived from questions about
contemporary aspects of the organization and the
subsidiary. We are still mindful of the likelihood of
some measurement error in our data and so
following Wright, Gardner, Moynihan, and Park
(2001) we took a number of steps to minimize such
error by: ensuring that the most knowledgeable
and authoritative respondent was used; being
sensitive to the information demands on the
respondent; communicating in advance the kind
of information we would require; and devoting
considerable time to the wording of the items
through exhaustive development and piloting of
the questionnaire. Nevertheless, we acknowledge
the use of a single respondent as a limitation. There
are other limitations too of course. The cell sizes are
at times a little small, and variation within cells
sometimes is limited. Moreover, some of the con-
trols, such as those relating to ‘strategic hetero-
geneity’, might be refined further in future
research.
While claims concerning the universal primacy
of either standardization or local adaptation to
institutional constraints are attractive in providing
a neat story, our analysis has shown that neither is
an accurate picture. Of course, our findings cannot
be generalized across all areas of HR practice, nor
to all countries, and we acknowledge these
‘boundary constraints’ (Whetten, 1989: 492) on
our argument. It follows that it will be useful to
extend the range of countries in future research. A
natural extension to this analysis would be to
extend it to new countries. One extension would
be to the USA, the largest destination for, and
source of, FDI. This would present the opportunity
to consider US MNCs in their domestic setting,
and compare them with foreign MNCs. Another
extension would be to emerging or transition
economies, which have been both the recipient
and source of a growing amount of foreign direct
investment and have been exposed to western
management practices. Would the same conclu-
sions regarding the influences of dominance and
standardization on the one hand and national
distinctiveness and localization on the other? This
is a task left to the future.
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NOTES
1We constructed weights in cases where the differ-
ence between the population and the achieved sam-
ple was greater than 5 %. Our analysis indicated that
the descriptive statistics did not change using
weighted data. Following conventions, weights are
not appropriate for the multivariate analysis.
2We created a series of dummy variables (Profes-
sional; Associate Professional and Technical; Adminis-
trative; Skilled Trades; Sales; Operators; Elementary;
and Other) and included these in additional analyses
to check whether the occupational category of the
LOG affected the results. In some cases we encoun-
tered difficulties in getting these data, meaning that
we would have had to exclude Denmark from the
article had we included this variable in the full analysis.
Nevertheless, we were keen to explore the impact of
including the LOG variable in the other four countries
and found that the country differences revealed in
Tables 4, 5, and 6 remained almost exactly the same.
3To explore the data further, we also created an
index of the six practices and conducted linear
regression analysis on this index. The support for the
hypotheses tested this way was broadly similar to that
generated by the logistic regressions on the individual
practices. Moreover, we split the index of six practices
into two indices, one for managers and one for the
LOG, and the results were very similar to those for the
single index.
4Given that Table 1 shows that the UK and Spain
share many similarities in terms of inequality and
union coverage, and that Ireland and Canada also
share similarities, we also conducted the analysis with
these countries paired together. Thus the analysis
contained a Nordic reference category and the UK–
Spain and Ireland–Canada. The pattern of the results is
very similar to those reported in the article.
5From the models with interactions reported in
columns C in Tables 4, 5, 6 and in Table 7, we can
analyze differences in the take-up of practices for
different countries and groups of MNCs. Let X0b be the
linear combination of control variables and their
associated parameters. Considering the model in
column C in Tables 4, 5, and 6, the probability of
taking-up a given practice is given by (we omit the
subindex for the firms):
Fðb0 þ X0bþ b1UK þ b2Canada þ b3Ireland
þ b4Spain þ b5USown þ b6UK  USown
þ b7Canada  USown þ b8Ireland  USown
þ b9Spain  USownÞ;
where F(.) is the cumulative logistic distribution, USown
is the dummy for US MNCs (ref. category: non US
MNCs) and UK, Canada, Ireland and Spain are dum-
mies for each country (ref. category: Nordic group,
composed by Denmark and Norway). If we are
interested, for example, in UK vs Denmark-Norway in
the domestic operations, we compare these two
probabilities: Fðb0 þ X0bþ b1Þ for UK, and Fðb0 þ X0b)
for the Nordic group. If we are interested in the same
comparison, UK vs Denmark–Norway, but in US
MNCs, the probabilities to compare are: Fðb0 þ X0bþ
b1 þ b5 þ b6Þ for UK, and F b0 þ X0bþ b5ð Þ in the
Nordic group. We proceed analogously for all the
possible comparisons.
Considering the models in Table 7, that include the
interactions of the country dummies (for the six
individual countries) with US ownership and also with
being a domestic firm (ref. category: UK*USowned),
the probability of taking-up a given practice is given
by:
Fðk0 þ X0kþ k1Canada  USown
þ k2Ireland  USown þ k3Spain  USown
þ k4Denmark  USown þ k5Norway
 USown þ k6UK  UK own þ k7Canada
 Canada own þ k8Ireland  Ireland own
þ k9Spain  Spain own þ k10Denmark
 Denmark own þ k11Norway  Norway ownÞ
In we are interested, for example, in the differences in
UK between US MNCs and indigenous firms, we
compare: Fðk0 þ X0kÞ for US MNCs in UK, and Fðk0 þ
X0kþ k6Þ for domestic firms in UK. In Canada, the
probabilities to compare are: Fðk0 þ X0kþ k1Þ for US
MNCs in Canada, and Fðk0 þ X0kþ k7Þ for Canadian
firms in Canada. Analogously, we can compare US
MNCs and indigenous firms in each country.
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